Andy Dalton: The Hue Jackson Effect
Sep 14, 2014; Cincinnati, OH, USA; Cincinnati Bengals quarterback Andy Dalton (14) against the Atlanta Falcons at Paul Brown Stadium. The Bengals won 24-10. Mandatory Credit: Aaron Doster-USA TODAY Sports
For the first three years of his career, Andy Dalton ran the Cincinnati Bengals offense under Jay Gruden, who is now with the Washington Redskins. Gruden is not a bad offensive coordinator, per say, but he was not a good fit for Dalton. With Gruden constructing and calling the offense, Dalton was forced to read too much of the field too often and, as a result, Dalton was inconsistent from performance to performance. Of course, Jackson has not miraculously coached Dalton into an All-Pro quarterback, but instead, he has designed the offense such that Dalton’s ability can be maximized.
Over the summer of 2013, Chip Kelly made his transition to the NFL as the Philadelphia Eagles head coach and many believed that he would flop (I will not lie, I once believed that). After his first 19 games, it is apparent that his offensive concepts can be applied to the NFL and be effective. Jackson took note of some of Kelly’s concepts and has integrated them into his own offense in order to allow Dalton to thrive.
In short, the offense creates “can’t lose” situations for the offense that require the quarterback to do little more than count defenders before the snap. Of course, not every play is designed that way, but there are many concepts and combinations that create such situations for Dalton. The simplicity of the offense enables Dalton to think less and execute more efficiently. This has done wonders for the fourth year quarterback.
Below is a read-option variant where instead of taking off for himself, Dalton’s “other” option is to throw a bubble screen.
As stated before, it is little more than a numbers game. The Bengals line up three receivers to the left, but only two Ravens defenders are close enough to the trio to make any sort of play. The two leading receivers block for Mohamed Sanu and he gains an easy seven yards or so, as well as a first down. In an alternate universe where the Ravens line up three defenders on the trio (which means fewer defenders in the box), Dalton hands off the ball to Giovani Bernard. As can clearly be seen, the offensive line run blocks instead of pass block because the throw, if that is the case, is intended to be so quick that it is more effective to assume the run. Either way, this play is an easy decision for Dalton and he executes it without flaw.
This is yet another read-option variant in which the “other” option is a pass. This is dubbed as a “tight end pop” in which he runs straight and almost immediately looks for the ball.
Dalton’s decision depends on the inside linebacker. In this case, the linebacker bites for the fake handoff, which allows tight end Tyler Eifert some room over the top of the linebacker. Dalton pulls away from the handoff and fires at Eifert for a solid chunk of yards. Alternately, the linebacker may hesitate on the handoff, in which case Dalton would actually hand the ball to the running back because the tight end will not be open.
Here, Dane Sanzenbacher (filling in for Marvin Jones) runs a “smash” route, which has been a route Jackson has favored for Sanzenbacher. If lead correctly, this throw would be completed, but no matter the system, Dalton is still Dalton.
This next example is equal parts Jackson’s play calling and Dalton’s execution. Jackson calls for a basic “four verts” concept in trio right with a “jumbo” slot in Jermaine Gresham.
Dalton takes notice of the defensive back playing far off from Gresham and chooses him as his target immediately. As soon as Gresham makes his break, Dalton hits the end of his drop, loads, and fires for a completion.
Below is an example of awareness of the situation. Dalton and Jackson seem to be on the same page in noting that AJ Green has been pressed all game, and that he has been able to beat it. So, Jackson isolates Green to one side. At the snap, Dalton peeks left to hold all other defenders, then turns and throws at a wide open Green, who was well aware that his sole job was to beat Jason McCourty’s press attempt.
Again, bad Dalton shows his face despite having open receivers. Not only does Dalton have a receiver open on a “dig,” but Jeremy Hill has a good chunk of yards in front of him as a check down option. Instead, Dalton carelessly throws a bomb to a well-covered Brandon Tate.
Last, but not least, is an example of Jackson’s brilliance. Dalton fakes a “screen/swing” to Hill, then jump-throws to Ryan Hewitt (the fullback). Had Hewitt not ran directly into a defender, this play would have gone for many more yards as the rest of the defense was sucked into the bait throw to Hill.
Including plays like the ones above, Dalton’s overall job has been simplified. As said before, Gruden too often forced him to read too much of the field. That is not the case under Jackson. Dalton is now almost exclusively reading just one side of the field. To a minor extent, that makes it easier on the defenses, but the effects it has on Dalton outweigh its chance to help the defense. It allows Dalton to read one or two defenders, and if the throw is not there, take off or check it down to Bernard (Bernard is quite often left as a check down option).
Of course, as seen above, Dalton’s bad side will peek its face every now and again, but such is the case for every case. The point is that Jackson has done a wonderful job of limiting those mistakes on Dalton’s part and, as a result, the Bengals have started the year strong. Expect the Bengals offense to continue to be exciting and lethal under the command of Jackson and Dalton.